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Choices about accounting methods which firms adopt can 
have economic implications when a specific reporting treat­
ment affects a company’s cash flows, and their distributions 
among a firm's stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, managers, 
bondholders etc.)1· Assuming that each individual aims to 
maximise his utility, it is sensible to expect that he will pre­
fer a higher to a lower cash flow surplus (Grinyer, 1986). 
Therefore, when the adoption of a particular accounting 
methods can increase, or decrease, different stakeholders 
wealth, these parties have an apparent motive for prefer­
ring certain accounting methods (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978; and, 1986). When financial and tax accounting treat­
ments coincide, the choice of a reporting method for finan­
cial accounting purposes has important cash-flow implica­
tions, through its impact on the level of a firm’s tax burden 
(Wolfson, 1993; Cloyd et al., 1996). A tax-reducing strat­
egy, therefore, can have positive cash-flow implications. As 
a consequence, assuming investors’ rationality and efficient 
capital markets, accounting methods that minimise taxable 
income should be preferred (Biddle and Lindhal, 1982; Nie- 
haus, 1989). However, if the reduction of a firm’s tax liability 
is usually accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the 
firm’s reported income, the implications of a tax-reducing 
strategy may not always be beneficial for those who have a 
stake in the firm. In other words, the implications are not 
necessarily identical for every stakeholder; it may not even
1. Notice that it is not assumed that the firm has a utility function. As Jensen 
(1983) has put it: “Organisations do not have preferences, and they do not 
choose in the conscious and rational sense that we attribute to people.” 
(p. 327). The firm within the neo-classical economics is conceived as "...a 
production function to which maximisation objective has been ascribed.” 
(Williamson, 1981, p. 1539; see also Demsetz, 1983; and Jensen, 1983). 
This perception of the concept of the firm has been developed in order 
to facilitate neo-classical economics main objective which is: “...to under­
stand how the price system co-ordinates the use of resources, not to un­
derstand the inner workings of real firms.”(Demsetz, 1983, p. 377; see also 
Jensen, 1983). Despite the merits of this approach for the analysis of the 
functions of market mechanism, it is not a particularly helpful one in de­
veloping a theory concerning organisations’ structure and internal modes 
of behaviour (Jensen, 1983).
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be identical for the same party under all circumstances2. 
Under certain circumstances, a strategy aimed at increasing 
tax savings may negatively affect the wealth of various par­
ties involved in the firm, including those that implement it3. 
The adverse consequences of a tax-reducing policy desig­
nate the non-tax costs of such a policy; in most cases these 
are related to a reduction in the level of reported financial 
figures; the non-tax costs are alternatively called the finan­
cial accounting costs of a tax-reducing policy. In any case, 
each firm’s stakeholder is presumed to weigh the tax ben­
efits against the costs that accompany a tax-reducing policy 
(Cloyd et al., 1996).
The firm’s ownership/control status has been identi­
fied as a factor that gives rise to significant non-tax costs, 
and influences the balance between tax benefits and non­
tax costs4. This study aims to present the arguments that 
have been articulated regarding the impact that firm’s own­
ership/control status may have on firm’s accounting policy 
decisions and more specifically on the balance between the 
tax benefits and non-tax costs that may result from those 
decisions. Furthermore the findings of empirical research 
aiming to examine the association between firms’ owner­
ship/control status and their accounting policy choices are 
reviewed.
Firm’s ownership structure and non-tax costs
The non-tax costs of tax planning often arise as result of the
2. See, Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson, (1990); Scholes and Wolfson, (1992); 
Wolfson, (1993).
3. See, Scholes and Wolfson, (1992); Wolfson, (1993); Cloyd et al., (1996); 
Klassen, (1997).
4. Others factors that can influence the balance between tax benefits and 
non-tax costs are (i) management’s perceptions about the impact of ac­
counting figures on the firm’s value, (ii) the perceptions of external parties 
regarding management’s efficiency and ability, (iii) the perceived influence 
that reported figures can have on the ability of a firm to raise debt-capital 
at reasonable costs, (iv) the various regulatory and lending-jelated con­
straints that a firm may face (see, Scholes and Wolfson, (1992); Wolfson, 
(1993); Cloyd et al., (1996); Klassen, (1997).
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fact that in order to maximise tax savings, it is usually nec­
essary to accelerate expenses or to waive revenues (Cloyd et 
al., 1996). Such a policy, though, will usually reduce the level 
of reported profits. In efficiently functioning capital mar­
kets, firms’ shareholders are assumed to respond adversely 
to lower cash flows, since the value of their stockholdings in 
a company is a function of the underlying cash flows (Bid­
dle and Lindhal, 1982; Abdel-Khalik, 1985; Hunt, 1985). As 
a consequence, a firm’s owners are expected to prefer that 
their firm is involved in tax planning in order to maximise 
the present value of any tax savings; since, according to Nie- 
haus (1989):
“In a well-functioning capital market, higher tax liabilities
imply a lower share price, ceteris paribus” (p. 270)
However, the resulting reduction in the financial account­
ing figures can have real wealth implications for a firm’s 
management. The extensive use of compensation and bo­
nus schemes based on accounting-numbers, means that a 
manager’s utility becomes a function of the level of bonus 
payments, which in turn are a function of the level of re­
ported profits5. Since managers are assumed to maximise 
their utility, which is directly related to their compensa­
tion, it is logical to hypothesise that they will prefer higher 
to lower compensation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, and 
1986; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981). Given that differ­
ent reporting methods have different impacts on the level 
of reported profits, and as result on the level of a manager’s 
compensation, a firm’s managers will not be indifferent to 
differences between different accounting methods. They are 
more likely to prefer accounting treatments that will result 
in higher rather than lower reported profits. As Hagerman 
and Zmijewski (1979) point out:
“If management incentive schemes are related to account-
5. See, Watts and Zimmerman, (1978), and (1986); Zmijewski and Hager­
man, (1981); Dhaliwall et al., (1982); Kelly, (1983); Healy, (1985); Pavlik et 
al., (1993).
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ing earnings we expect that management has an incentive 
to use accounting principles that increase accounting earn­
ings if part of their income is derived from incentive plans.
(p. 145)6
Empirical research has discovered that the use of account­
ing-based bonus plans does not necessarily imply that man­
agers will prefer earnings-increasing reporting methods7. 
Yet it is quite likely that a reduction in reported profits as 
a result of an active tax-planning strategy will, in most cas­
6. A necessary prerequisite for bonus plans to induce certain managers’ pref­
erences with regard to reporting methods is that the compensation com­
mittee which supervises compensation schemes and bonus plans does not 
adjust the provisions of relevant schemes in response to changes in ac­
counting standards (see, Healey, Kang and Palepu, 1987; Niehaus, 1989). 
Healey et al., (1987) have not found any evidence which supports that 
in response to changes in accounting methods “..., reported earnings are 
transformed to earnings under the original accounting method for com­
puting compensation awards.” (p. 32). On the other hand, the parameters 
of the compensation plan are modified subsequently to a change in ac­
counting method. However, even in these cases the adjustment seems to 
be partially related to wider industry and economy related developments. 
On the basis of these findings Healy et al. conclude that the hypothesis 
that: “...the compensation committee nullifies the effect of an accounting 
on bonus and salary awards by modifying the parameters of the compen­
sation-earnings relation.” (p. 33) cannot be rejected. However, this finding 
is inconclusive given “...the effect of the accounting change on compen­
sation,.., is too small compared to the time-related effects to allow us to 
discriminate between the null and alternative hypotheses." (p. 33). Fur­
thermore, Healy et al. provide evidence which suggests that changes in ac­
counting methods which are supposed to result in a decrease of reported 
income, and therefore to be unfavourable for top executives remunera­
tion, do not appear to have a substantial effect on senior managers salaries 
and bonus payments, especially if the effect of economy and industry wide 
changes on compensation over time is taken into account. More specifi­
cally, the Healy et al. study indicates economy and industry wide factors 
- which are contemporaneous but unrelated to the accounting methods 
change - will result in compensation increases which will more than set-off 
the potentially decreasing effects of changes in accounting methods such 
a switch from FIFO to LIFO inventory method or from straight-line to ac­
celerated depreciation method.
7. Healy (1985) has provided evidence which suggests that when bonus plans 
include terms which define an upper limit on the level of bonus payment, 
managers may have an incentive to adopt earnings-decreasing accounting 
treatments.
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es, reduce the level of bonus compensation and therefore a 
management’s wealth. Thus, through the pursue of a tax- 
reducing policy, non-tax costs ensue for those managers 
whose remuneration is dependent to a significant extent on 
bonus compensation. These implications have been hypoth­
esised to be more significant for the management of wide­
ly-held firms, since accounting-determined compensation 
schemes are primarily used by investors in these firms for 
monitoring and motivating the top management.
The dispersion of a firm’s share capital over a large num­
ber of shareholders characterises modern industrial con­
cerns. Due to this development, the individual shareholder 
has seen his ability to oversee the conduct of companies’ 
management to diminish8. As a consequence, management 
has become increasingly independent from shareholders 
and increased their effective control over a firm’s affairs9. 
Under these circumstances, questions have been raised 
about whether a firm’s management will maximise share­
holders’ wealth; in other words, if they will they act in the 
shareholders’ interests10. It has been argued that manage­
ment will pursue such personal goals, even at the expense 
of owners’ interests. Managers’ aspirations for security, in­
8. See, Monsen and Downs, (1965); Galbraith, (1967), and, (1973); Demsetz 
and Lehn, (1985).
9. For the purposes of the present study the definition of control provided by 
Smith (1976), seems sufficient: “...control refers to the power to direct the 
affairs of the corporation or to determine the broad policies guiding the 
corporation. Control, used in this sense, does not necessarily imply active 
decision making of the firm, but it does imply involvement in the making 
of more fundamental decisions such as the selection of management.” (p. 
709). With regard to the effective control of company’s affairs by non-own­
ers managers of corporations see, Hindley, (1970); Scherer, (1980); Dem­
setz, (1983); Williamson, (1984).
10. See, Berle and Means, (1968 [1932]); Monsen and Downs, (1965); Wil­
liamson, (1981). Berle and Means (1968 [1932]) who expressed their 
doubt, as they state: “...have we any justification for assuming that those 
in control of a modern corporation will also choose to operate it in the in­
terests of the owners? The answer to this question will be depend on the 
degree to which the self-interest of those in control may run parallel to 
the interests of ownership and, insofar as they differ, on the checks on the 
use of power which may be established by political, economic, or social 
conditions." (pp. 113-114)
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creased salaries, enhanced power and prestige, can prompt 
them to direct funds to operations and activities which do 
not necessarily contribute to the maximisation of own­
ers’ utility11. In general, it has been maintained that, in the 
case of separation between management and ownership, a 
firm's top management is very likely to make financial and 
investment decisions that do not necessarily aim to maxi­
mise shareholders’ value12. Under these circumstances, the 
firm’s shareholders may devise mechanisms which will mo­
tivate the firm’s management to pursue policies which will 
further the owners’ interests (Dhaliwall et al., 1982; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986). Bonus-schemes and/or compensa­
tion plans constitute such a mechanism13. The basic ratio­
nale that underlies the usage of such incentives-schemes14 is
11. See, Williamson, (1963); Berle and Means, (1968 [1932]); McEachern, 
(1978). For instance, Williamson (1963) maintains that management may 
have a preference for types of expenditures - i.e. staff expenditures, emol­
ument expenditures, availability of funds for discretionary investments 
- that will enable it to achieve the aforementioned objectives. Those ex­
penditures, however, “...have value additional to which derives from their 
productivity” (Williamson, 1963, p 1034; see also Monsen and Downs, 
1965).
12. See, Monsen and Downs, (1965); Scherer, (1980); Hunt, (1986). The no­
tion that the separation of management from ownership is widespread 
among the large industrial corporations is not unanimously accepted. Ev­
idence has been provided which suggests that among the largest Amer­
ican firms the diversion between management and ownership has not 
been as widespread as it has been believed or hypothesised to be (see, e.g. 
Chevalier, 1969; Burch, 1972; Pederson and Tabb, 1976; Scherer, 1980; 
Demsetz, 1983; Hunt, 1986). In addition, the diversion between owner­
ship and management that allegedly characterises modern corporations 
is a development that is peculiar to the US and the UK. In the industrial 
concerns of Continental Europe and Japan there appears to be a strong 
link between the ownership interests and management (see, Choi and 
Mueller, 1984; Meek and Saudagaran, 1990; Wolfson, 1993; Galbraith, 
1994).
13. See, Demsetz, (1983); Healey, (1985); Raviv, (1985); Watts and Zimmer­
man, (1986). It is assumed that managers do not own any proportion of a 
firm’s stock capital. In case they own a proportion of a firm’s share capital, 
they have an incentive to abstain from value reducing actions. Assuming 
rational expectations, the market will anticipate any opportunistic mana­
gerial behaviour, and will discount the value of the stock outstanding. 
Thus, managers will bear the cost of a value-reducing action.
14. Raviv (1985) propose two additional explanations for the employment
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that by connecting managers’ compensation with a compa­
ny’s performance, the interests of shareholders and manag­
ers will be aligned15 (Jensen and Zimmerman, 1985; Pavlik 
et al., 1993). As Cloyd et al. (1996) state:
the diffuse ownership of public firms causes public share­
holders to rely more heavily on formal controls, written in 
terms of accounting numbers to control management’s ac­
tivities.” (p. 28)16
There are a number of reasons why in owner-controlled 
firms, the need for compensation plans is less apparent. 
Firstly, the owner-managers will refrain from value-reduc­
ing actions, since the cost of such actions will borne by 
themselves17. Conversely, the managers of management-
of compensation plans. According to the first explanation compensa­
tion contracts function as mechanism which aims: "...to screen and sort 
among managers of various ability levels." (Raviv, 1985, p. 243). Compen­
sation plans are aimed to attract and retain the most efficient managers, 
while less efficient ones are discouraged to apply or impelled to resign. 
Under the second exegesis regarding bonus-schemes are used as instru­
ments for signalling to the market “good news" concerning the firm. It is 
supposed that a convincing way to communicate that information to the 
public is to connect: “...the managers’ compensation to the measure of 
performance which they trying to signal.” (Raviv, 1985, p. 243). It should 
be noted that both of these explanations do not assume any conflict of 
interest between owners and managers.
15. The findings of empirical studies suggest that markets perceive that com­
pensation plans and bonus schemes facilitate an alignment between the 
interests of owners and managers (Jensen and Zimmerman, 1985; Hunt, 
1986; Pavlik et al., 1993). The executives’ compensation appears to be 
positively related with stock price changes (see, Murphy, 1985; Cough- 
lan-Schmidt, 1985), while the introduction of compensation plans - 
short-term and long-term alike - are related to an increase in the firm’s 
stock prices (Larcker, 1983; Brickley et al., 1985; Tehranian and Wae- 
gelein, 1985). Furthermore, it appears that firms which employ long­
term incentive performance plans significantly outperform firms which 
do not around the announcement date of acquisition (Tehranian et al., 
1987 a) and disposition (Tehranian et al., 1987 b) of important business 
sections.
16. Despite the fact that Cloyd et al. (1997) do not explicitly refer to man­
agement-controlled firms, they implicitly do so, since public firms char­
acterised by diffused ownership are most likely to be management-con- 
trolled ones.
17. See, Jensen and Meckling, (1976); Salamon and Smith, (1979); Kelly,
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controlled firms, due to the fact that they own only a very 
limited proportion of stock capital - or no proportion at all 
- are less likely to refrain from value reducing actions, since 
the effect on their welfare from any reduction in the firm’s 
value will be minimal or non-existent (Watts and Zimmer-
(1983); Watts and Zimmerman, (1986). It should be noted that the fact 
that there is no separation between management and ownership does 
not necessarily mean that the owner-manager will pursue value maxi­
misation policies (McEachern, 1978; Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). McEachern (1978) argues that owner-managers, as the managers 
of management-controlled firms, may have a tendency towards building 
economic and industrial empires - i.e. increasing firms’ size - sacrificing 
in many instances, however, firms’ profitability. Schcumpeter (1934) re­
ferring to owner-entrepreneurs, argues that their behaviour can be driv­
en from not entirely rational - in economic sense - motives, and thus the 
expansion of their firms can take proportions out of the economically 
justifiable ones. The motive behind economic actions can be: "...the will 
to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others, to 
succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of success, but of success itself. 
From this aspect, economic action becomes akin to sport - there are fi­
nancial races, or rather boxing-matches. The financial result is a second­
ary consideration,...” (p. 93). Within a similar context Knight (1921) ar­
gues that: “...we must emphasise the impulse to create.”(p.l62) and "The 
business man has the same fundamental psychology as the artist, inven­
tor, or statesman.” (p. 163), while “...the desire for the increased income 
is not the dominant motive in much of this proved by the fact that men 
invest as desperately in an enterprise never likely to be profitable as they 
do in the most prosperous concern,..." (p. 162). In addition, the presence 
of owner-managers does not necessarily lead to an absence of shirking. 
Demsetz (1983) argues since the owner-manager spends a considerable 
number of hours in a job is quite likely that he will increase his at-job- 
consumption regardless of the potentially decreasing effect that will have 
on firm’s profitability (see also Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In fact, given 
that owner-managers are supposed to face relatively fewer external con­
strains that can enforce them to follow value-maximising policies, are 
more likely to undertake actions that are usually ascribed to managers 
of management-controlled firms (McEachern, 1978). Thus, McEarch- 
en argues that: “The owner-managed firm may therefore operate like 
an extreme form of manager-controlled firm,...” (p.259). The empirical 
research does not seem to provide a conclusive evidence of whether 
management-controlled firms significantly differ from the owner-con­
trolled ones, with respect to their performance and other related issues. 
A number of studies by examining and comparing various performance 
indicators of owner and management-controlled firms have concluded 
that owner-controlled firms on average appear to be the more profitable 
(e.g. Monsen et al., 1968; Hindley, 1970; Larner, 1970; Boudreux, 1973;
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man, 1986). Secondly, in the case of closely-held firms the 
extensive involvement of a firm’s owners in the administra­
tion of the company ensures a close monitoring of managers’ 
conduct and directly motivates their performance. In such 
circumstances, the need for introducing compensation/bo­
nus plans is not pressing18. Empirical evidence seems to sup­
port the argument that the employment of compensation 
plans is associated with the ownership/control status of the 
firm (see, Collins etal., 1981; Cloyd etal., 1996). It appears 
that the executives of management-controlled firms, due 
to extensive use of accounting-based bonus plans in these 
firms, can face substantial non-tax costs when an active tax-
Plamer, 1973; Stano, 1976). On the other hand, an indication has been 
provided that does not support the assumption that the manager-con- 
trolled firms will be significandy less profitable comparing to the owner- 
controlled ones (Kamerschen, 1968; Radice, 1971; Elliot, 1972; Soren­
son, 1974; Holl, 1975; Ware, 1975; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). It should 
be noted that some of the empirical studies mentioned above have in­
dicated that the relationship between ownership structure and a firm’s 
performance is not a straight-forward one. For instance, Plamer’s (1973) 
findings suggest that only in industries characterised by a high degree 
of monopoly power do management-controlled firms appear to be sig­
nificandy less profitable comparing to their owner-controlled counter­
parts. The infirm constraint imposed by the market competition provide 
to these firms’ managers with the opportunity of diverging from profit- 
maximising behaviour. Similarly, Holl (1975) notices that a firms’ indus­
try classification influences the explanatory power of ownership-struc­
ture with regard to the performance characteristics of the two group of 
firms. As far as the hypothesis that the managers’ preference for expan­
sion and certain type expenditures concerns, again the existing evidence 
is not altogether conclusive. It has been hypothesised, for instance, that 
the management-controlled firms will demonstrate a strong tendency 
towards profits’ retention as opposed to dividend’s payments, since re­
tained earnings constitute a source of funds for financing expansion and 
for expenditures discretion (see, Hunt, 1986). The findings of empirical 
research, however, do not seem to support this hypothesis, since they 
testify that the dividend payout ratios for the management-controlled 
firms are higher than the respective ratios for owner-controlled firms 
(see, e.g. Kamerschen, 1970; Sorenson, 1974; Holl, 1975; Ware, 1975). 
Hunt (1986) concludes that: “...the evidence is quite convincing that, con­
trary to the predictions of the managerialists, owners who are also man­
agers of a firm appears to have a higher preference for retained earnings 
than managers of other types of firms.”(pp. 97-98)
18. See, Smith, (1976); Salamon and Smith, (1979); Dhaliwall et al., (1982); 
Kelly, (1983); Penno and Simon, (1986).
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reducing policy is followed. Managers of owner-controlled 
firms, on the other hand, are not supposed to face similar 
non-tax costs. Thus, they can get involved in tax-planning 
more aggressively19.
The above discussion presupposes that managers of a 
widely-held firm own an insubstantial proportion of a firms’ 
share capital - or no proportion at all. Yet, it has been suggest­
ed that managerial ownership of a substantial proportion of 
a firm’s share capital can align managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests20. Additionally, it should be noted that compensa­
tion plans are not exclusively based on reported earnings. 
Managers’ remuneration may be linked with a firm’s stock 
value by correlating managers’ compensation with compa­
ny’s share price, or by offering stock-options to managers 
instead of directly paying them cash bonuses (Kelly, 1983). 
When ownership of a firm’s stock capital constitutes a sub­
stantial proportion of managers’ personal wealth21, manag­
ers have a personal interest in ensuring that value-reducing 
actions are avoided; otherwise managers will bear the cost 
of undertaking such actions. Demsetz (1983) argues that:
“..., [managers] receive incomes that are highly correlated with 
stock performance. This correlation derives not only from bo­
nuses but also, to a surprising degree, from managers’ owner­
ship of stock. Ownership and control are not so separate as 
is often supposed.”(p. 388). Therefore: “...managers’ sharehold­
19. See, Smith, (1976); Dhaliwall etal., (1982); Scholes and Wolfson, (1992); 
Wolfson, (1993); Cloyd etal., (1996); Klassen, (1997).
20. See, Demsetz, (1983); Benston, (1985); Jensen and Zimmerman, (1985); 
Hunt, (1986); Pavlik et al., (1993).
21. It should be noted that, what is of importance is not so much what per­
centage of a firm’s share capital is owned by managers, but what pro­
portion of their personal wealth this percentage constitutes (see, Kel­
ly, 1983; Demsetz, 1983; Benston, 1985). As Benston (1985) states : ”... 
a very small percentage of a large publicly-traded company is a lot of 
money...”... “For executives (as for other people) the determining variable 
is the amount of the executives total wealth invested in the companies 
they manage."(p.72). Lewellen (1969) indicates that for top executives the 
stock-based compensation exceeds four times their after-tax compensa­
tions. Demsetz (1983) provides evidence which suggests that a consider­
able proportion of firms’ share capital is owned by top executives in all 
but most largest firms (see, also Murphy, 1985).
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ings create a substantial linkage between the financial interests 
of managers and those of outside shareholders.” (p. 389)22
Thus, when stockholdings constitute a substantial propor­
tion of executives wealth, tax-reducing policies may be pur­
sued, since they constitute a value-increasing choice. Nie- 
haus (1989) argues that high managerial ownership tends to 
reduce the conflict of interest between owners and manag­
ers with respect to the trade-off between tax benefits and 
non-tax costs. In any case, managers will face the trade­
off between increasing reported profits, and as a result in­
creasing their remuneration, or increasing tax benefits and 
thus increasing their wealth, due to a rise in the value of any 
stock or stock options which they hold. The outcome of this 
trade-off will ultimately be dependent on what proportion 
of a managers’ wealth each of the above elements consti­
tute. In other words, the more correlated managers’ person­
al wealth is with stock values, the more likely it is that they 
will pursue a tax-reducing policy, since that policy will ce­
teris paribus result in the increase of their overall wealth.
It has been argued that managers have an incentive to 
refrain from value-reducing actions, irrespective of the size 
of their equity stake in the firm. The competition in labour 
market for managerial skills can induce managers to ab­
stain from value-reducing actions23. This competition can 
be both external and internal. Assuming that the labour 
market is efficient, it has been argued that managers will 
restrain from value reducing actions in order to avoid un­
favourable adjustments to their compensation. It has been 
suggested that when outside directors are appointed to the 
board of directors, the monitoring and disciplinary func­
22. Findings of empirical research seem to support this argument. More spe­
cifically, Lewellen et al. (1985) and Tehranian et a/. (1987, a and b) pro­
vides that stock-market returns are positively correlated with the pro­
portion of managers’ shareholdings. Walking and Long (1984, as cited in 
Jensen and Zimmerman, 1985) provide evidence that extensive manage­
ment shareholdings lessens the friction between the interests of manag­
ers and owners in the case of take-over (see, also Pavlik et al., 1993).
23. See, Zimmerman, (1979); Fama, (1980); Fama and Jensen, (1983); Watts 
and Zimmerman, (1986).
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tions assumed by the board can constitute an effective con­
trol of management’s decisions and conduct24. Because the 
value of outside directors’ human capital in labour mark­
er for corporate directors will be evaluated on the basis of 
their performance, they have an incentive to perform their 
tasks responsibly and efficiently (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jen­
sen, 1983; Beasley, 1996). Similarly, the fear of professional 
disgrace that may result from not strictly fulfilling their du­
ties can prompt outside directors to apply strict controls on 
managers’ actions (Ricardo-Campell, 1983). It seems, there­
fore, that outside directors have important incentives for 
restraining managers from any opportunistic action which 
may hurt owners’ interests (Ricardo-Campell, 1983). As Ri- 
cardo-Campel stated:
“The stockholders or risk takers, through the directors, 
whom they elect, do have some monitoring and decision 
controls. Ownership and management are not completely 
separate.” (p. 393)25
24. See, Fama, (1980); Fama and Jensen, (1983); Ricardo-Campell, (1983); 
Williamson, (1984). However, when the board of directors is dominated 
by inside-directors its ability to adequately perform its controlling and 
monitoring duties can be seriously impeded. Top officials after succeed­
ing securing a membership in the board of directors may "...decide that 
collusion and expropriation of security holder wealth are better than 
competition among themselves” (Fama, 1980, p.293; see also Hindley, 
1970; and Beasley, 1996). Yet, Williamson (1984) argues that the fact that 
an extensive participation of top managers in the board of directors is 
likely to undermine a board’s ability to perform its controlling duties 
does not necessarily means that managers should completely excluded 
from it. He identifies three benefits that can ensue from managers’ mem­
bership in the board of directors. Firstly, it enables outside directors to 
gain a first hand experience of management’s conduct and competence, 
and as result facilitates boards’ function as a supervising and governing 
body. Secondly, the board’s decision making function is facilitated by the 
fact that managers’ participation improves the board’s ability to collect 
necessary information. Thirdly, it can help in preserving the occupation­
al relationship between management and the firm. Williamson stresses, 
however, that a boards’ main responsibility is to protect shareholders’ in­
terests, and therefore managers’ participation should be restricted with­
in the limits that enables it to adequately perform its duties.
25. Results of empirical studies seem to support the argument that inclusion 
of outside directors significantly enhances the controlling and monitor-
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Thus, outside directors are supposed to detect any value- 
reducing behaviour of the top managers, and arrange man­
agers’ compensation accordingly. Furthermore, if a firm’s 
management is involved in value-reducing actions, this in­
formation will eventually become known and their profes­
sional reputations will be impaired. Thus, even if a manag­
er’s salary is not affected at present, it will most likely be 
affected in the future. Consequently, a manager who is not 
going to retire in the near future has an incentive to refrain 
from being involved in actions that harm shareholders’ in­
terests (Fama, 1980). As Demsetz (1983) argued:
“Managerial personnel are also quite concerned about the value 
of their services to other firms that may seek to employ them. 
The many years of investment in human capital and reputation 
are not lightly put at risk in the pursuit of advantages offered by 
shirking.[an example of value-reducing action]” (p. 387)
Additionally, competition within the firm may impose re­
strictions on managers’ behaviour. Senior managers have 
an incentive to examine and control the efficiency of sub­
ordinate managers, since the former’ executives compensa­
tion and promotion can be determined, among others, on 
the basis of their ability to adequately perform such a duty. 
Similarly, the subordinate managers are induced to moni­
tor their superiors, since their promotion prospects are en­
hanced by doing so (Fama, 1980). Furthermore, the welfare 
of subordinate manager is affected by their superiors’ value- 
reducing behaviour, since the value of their human capital 
in the labour market is negatively affected as a result of that
ing efficiency of that body. Lee et al. (1992, as cited Beasley, 1996) indi­
cate that in case of management buyouts, that shareholders’ wealth in­
creases when the majority of the members of the board of directors is 
consisted by outside directors, while the appointment of outside direc­
tors appears to be connected with positive share price reactions (Rosen- 
stein and Wyatt, 1990). The inclusion in the board of directors of outside 
ones seem to result in a decrease in the level of expenditures related with 
salaries’ payments (Brickley and James, 1987, as cited in Beasley, 1996). 
Moreover, the proportion of participation in the board of directors of 
outside directors appears to be negatively correlated with the likelihood 
of financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996).
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behaviour. Consequently, subordinate managers have an ob­
vious incentive to prevent their superiors from taking value- 
reducing actions (Fama, 1980; Zimmerman, 1979; and Fama 
Jensen, 1983). Zimmerman (1979) states: “As the superior’s 
decisions start to impinge on the subordinate’s welfare, the 
subordinates either try to convince their superior to elimi­
nate the wealth-reducing expenditures or they go directly to 
their superior’s principal.” (p.510). It appears, therefore, that 
competition in the labour market can give rise to mecha­
nisms that will limit managers’ ability to undertake value- 
reducing actions that may be harmful to owners’ interest. 
As Fama (1980) states:
“The viability of the large corporation with diffuse security 
ownership is better explained in terms of a model where the 
primary disciplining of managers comes through manage­
rial labour markets, both within and outside of the firm,...” 
(Fama, 1980, p.295)
Additionally, the competition in the market for corporate 
control has been advanced as mechanism that can refrain 
top management from assuming value-reducing activities26. 
For example, Manne (1965) argues that:
“Only the take-over scheme provides some assurance of com­
petitive efficiency among corporate managers and thereby af­
fords strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of 
small, non-controlling shareholders.” (p. 113)
According to Scherer (1980), the market for corporate con­
trol can restrict management’s opportunistic actions, and 
indeed prompt them to pursue policies that will be in share­
holders’ interest, since failure to maximise value:
“...will depress company stock prices below their potential 
value; this will induce some outside entrepreneur to bid for 
a controlling interest, remove the old management, and re-
26. See, Manne, (1965); Hindley, (1970); McEachern, (1978); Marris and 
Mueller, (1980); Scherer, (1980); Demsetz, (1983); Fama and Jensen, 
(1983); Hunt, (1986).
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direct the company’s energies toward increasing profits and 
hence stock values.” (p.37)
Thus, the labour market and the market for corporate con­
trol are assumed to exercise pressures on managers which 
can restrain them from undertaking value-reducing actions. 
As a consequence, managers are supposed to adopt account­
ing policies that maximise a firm’s value. Within this context 
it is reasonable to expect that considerations regarding non­
tax costs will not affect their decision making. As a result, 
tax-minimising strategies which result in an increase in the 
after-tax value of the firm will be pursued. If the above men­
tioned arguments are valid, then there should be no signifi­
cant difference between the accounting choices of the man­
agement and owner-controlled firms27. However, the ability 
of these mechanisms mentioned to check management dis­
cretion is called into question.
Doubts have been expressed about whether the board of 
directors, can effectively execute its monitoring role even 
when outside directors are present. Mace (1971, as cited in 
Scherer, 1980) argues that in management-controlled firms, 
outside members are usually selected by inside top man­
agers. Furthermore, because top management work full­
time and have detailed knowledge about the operations of 
the firms, they can control the information released to the 
board of directors. As a consequence, outside directors may 
be kept inadequately informed about the corporation’s oper­
ations, and play a rather passive role within the board. Thus,
27. An alternative approach to the issue of a potential conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders with respect to tax benefits vs. fi­
nancial reporting costs can be provided by the arguments developed by 
Grinyer (1986). While Grinyer is not explicitly concerned with the is­
sue of tax and non-tax considerations relating to an accounting-policy 
choice, his arguments can be relevant. He argues that managers prefer 
higher to lower cash-flows anyway, since high cash flows provide them 
with opportunities to directly increase their wealth and well-being - e.g. 
increased salaries, perquisites etc. - and their job security by reducing 
the possibility that the firm will not meet various financial constraints. 
Within this context it can be argued that managers will get involved in 
tax planning since by doing so they increase the available cash-flows. It 
should be noted that Grinyer does not make any inference regarding the
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the board of directors becomes an instrument which per­
petuates managers’ control without being able to effective­
ly monitor and control their conduct (Williamson, 1984). 
Scherer (1980) concludes that:
",«there is reason to believe that, at least in management- 
controlled corporations, the board of directors does not im­
pose much restraint on management’s operating discretion.” 
(p.33)
Likewise, the efficiency of the market for corporate control 
as a controlling mechanism has been questioned. If the mar­
ket for corporate control is to constitute an effective control 
over top management’s decisions and actions, it must be ef­
ficient and the value of controlling interests must exceed 
transaction costs (see, Hindley, 1970). However, Hindley 
(1970) has provided evidence which suggests that market 
control is not wholly effective. Furthermore, it appears that 
the transaction cost of displacing top management may be 
high. Thus, the threat of take-over may not be that effec­
tive a mechanism for compelling management to pursue 
value-maximising policies28. In addition, it has been argued 
that top management, due to its controlling interest in the 
company, can influence the information disclosed to share­
holders in a way that presents the firm’s performance and 
management’s efficiency, in a favourable light (Monsen and 
Downs, 1965; Williamson 1967, in Phillips and Williamson 
(ed.), 1967). As Monsen and Downs (1965) argue:
“Carefully screening all information which is forwarded to 
stockholders or the public at large so that it reflects an out­
standing management performance” and “..., it is quite easy 
for managers to conceal great deal of inefficiency from such
distribution of the increased cash flows between various firms parties. 
The distribution will be dependent on factors “...such as the relative pow­
er of different groups of participants, institutional controls, managers’ 
perceptions and preferences, and the level of completeness and breadth 
of distribution of economic information about the firm." (p. 320)
28. See, Manne, (1965); Williamson (1969), in Manne ed. (1969); Scherer, 
(1980); Demsetz and Lehn, (1985).
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[professional reporting agencies] “outsiders",.." (p. 232) [their 
italics]
Thus, a firm’s management, by issuing imperfect or incom­
plete information to shareholders, aims to impede them 
from detecting value-reducing actions which might be pur­
sued by managers. At the same time, the favourable pic­
ture that emerges from publicly-disclosed information con­
cerning a firm’s performance prevents current sharehold­
ers from supporting take-over attempts (Williamson, 1967, 
in Phillips and Williamson (ed.) 1967; Salamon and Smith, 
1979). In that way management defends its actions and se­
cures its position. Similarly, Schiff (1966) argues that, given 
the information asymmetry between managers and owners, 
the latter are not in a position to determine whether the for­
mer’s actions aim to maximise profits. Moreover, manage­
ment’s’ ability to choose reporting methods further impedes 
owners’ ability to judge and evaluate managers conduct. He 
maintains that:
"If there is a conflict between the managers’ and owners’ in­
terests in corporations with diffuse ownership, the oppor­
tunity to choose the accounting method gives an important 
advantage to the manager.” (Schiff, 1966, p.62)
It appears, therefore, that executives of manager-controlled 
firms, in order to protect their position from pressures from 
the board of directors and/or from competition in the mar­
ket for corporate control, may exercise control over the in­
formation it releases. Unquestionably, accounting informa­
tion is one of the main sources of information that might 
be controlled (Salamon and Smith, 1979; Dhaliwall et al.,
1982). Managers are supposed to: “...exercise their control 
over the information released regarding firm performance 
in an attempt to present the results of firm operation in a 
most favourable or defensible way.” (Salamon and Smith, 
1979, p. 319). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that they will 
prefer higher to lower reported profits, and thus they are 
more likely to choose accounting methods that will improve 
the level of earnings (Dhaliwal et al., 1982). Empirical re­
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search seems to support the contention that the manager- 
controlled will attempt to influence accounting information 
in a mode which may disguise a firm’s performance (Sal- 
amon and Smith, 1979)29.
Within this context, an active tax-reducing policy can 
generate significant non-tax costs for managers of manage­
ment-controlled firms, since it usually results in a lower re­
ported income. Conversely, in the case of the owner-con­
trolled firms, where owners themselves direct the firm or 
they oversee its administration closely, there is very little - if 
any - scope for the managers to control accounting informa­
tion. Consequently, the non-tax costs relating to tax plan­
ning can be trivial for the owner-controlled firms. There­
fore, it seems that certain types of ownership-structures can 
raise substantial non-tax costs, while other types of own­
ership-structure may be associated with lower financial re­
porting costs30.
29. Dhaliwall et al. (1982) maintains that the fact that managers attempt to 
manipulate accounting information in order to influence users of ac­
counts perceptions does not imply capital markets do not function ef­
ficiently, since “...these arguments do not assume that management can 
influence stock returns by choosing one set of accounting methods over 
others. The arguments only assume that the accounting methods chosen 
by management can convince some of the firm’s shareholders that man­
agement is doing creditable job and thus make these shareholders un­
willing to support a takeover.” (p. 43). [their italics].
30. It has been argued that managers of management-controlled firms will 
be concerned not only with the level of the reported profits but with the 
variability of profits across time, as well. In fact, the managers by choos­
ing a particular accounting method will aim : "...to reduce earnings fluc­
tuations rather than to maximise or minimise reported earnings,..." (Mo­
ses 1987, p.358). In other words they will be involved in what is called 
"income smoothing” which has been defined as : "...a means used by 
management to diminish the variability of a stream of reported income 
numbers relative to some perceived target stream by the manipulation 
of artificial (accounting) or real (transactional) variables.” (Koch, 1981, 
p. 574). Managers of management-controlled firms have been hypoth­
esised as being more inclined towards smoothing income figures. The 
appraisal of managers efficiency and abilities can motivate them to ar­
range reported earnings. As Monsen and Downs (1965, see also Smith, 
1976; Scherer 1980; Moses, 1987) state: "...although a very poor manage­
ment performance may result in a rebellion, a very good one does not 
usually cause a powerful movement among stockholders to reward their
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An alternative approach to examining the balance be­
tween tax benefits and non-tax costs, argues that the distinct 
“informational environment” in which management oper­
ate can generate important non-tax costs for owner-con- 
trolled firms. Due to the close relationship between manag­
ers and owners in closely-held firms, executives can directly 
communicate to shareholders, information regarding firm’s 
value and managers’ abilities, without being dependent on 
published financial statements (Wolfson, 1993; and Klas- 
sen, 1997). On the other hand, for managers of widely-held/ 
management-controlled firms, financial statements are one 
of the main devices available for signalling information to 
shareholders regarding firms’ value and management’s abil­
ity. Management’s failure to signal to shareholders - through 
reported earnings - increases in firm’s value and efficiency 
gains, can result in managers’ being undervalued by share­
holders (Klassen, 1997). Therefore, managers of widely-held 
firms may prefer higher to lower reported earnings. In or­
der to increase the level of reported income, managers: “... 
can borrow income from the next period in an attempt to 
increase the market’s assessment of their firm’s value.” (Klas­
sen, 1997, p. 458). However, the acceleration of reported in­
come will almost certainly increase taxable income. Despite 
the increase in tax payments, managers have to balance the 
tax cost with costs which may ensue if they do not adopt 
income-accelerating policies. Those costs include take-over 
threats, reductions in managers’ remuneration and so on 
(Stein, 1989; Klassen, 1997). The larger these costs, the more
managers with lavish bonuses. Hence the punishment of grievous error is 
greater than the rewardfor outstanding success. This asymmetry between 
failure and success tends to make the managers of a diffused-ownership 
firm behave differently from the managers of the type of owner-managed 
firm envisioned by traditional theory.” (p. 226) [emphasis in the original]. 
It should be noted that the pursue of a income smoothing policy does 
not aim to a reduction on reported profits but to : "...a gradually rising 
performance measure...” (Smith, 1976, p. 708). Therefore, even if the firm 
is engaged in an income smoothing policy, non-tax costs will most likely 
arise if an aggressive tax reducing policy is adopted. For the findings of 
empirical research regarding the relationship between a firm’s ownership 
structure and the adoption of income smoothing policies see subsequent 
paragraph.
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likely management are to sacrifice tax benefits in order to 
achieve higher reported profits. Thus, the different informa­
tional environments in which firms with different owner­
ship/control status operate, seem to influence the level of 
non-tax costs that firms face.
A subsequent section discusses findings of empirical re­
search, which generally support the argument that there is 
an association between ownership structure and reporting- 
policy decisions. Furthermore, empirical results suggest 
that the financial reporting costs (i.e. non-tax costs) which 
are associated with tax planning influence firms’ account­
ing choices for financial-reporting and tax-reporting pur­
poses. Firms’ ownership-structures also appear to influence 
the trade-off between tax and non-tax costs.
Review of findings of empirical research
The findings of empirical research are generally consistent 
with the hypothesis that a firm’s accounting-method choic­
es are not made in a random fashion; they suggest that an 
association may exist between firm’s ownership structure 
and reporting-methods selected.
The investigation of income smoothing behaviour, has 
been an area in which the association between a firm’s own­
ership/control status and its accounting choices has been 
examined. The studies of Gordon (1964, as cited in Hunt, 
1986) and Schiff (1966) constitute early attempts to study 
the association between accounting choices and firms’ 
ownership structures. Schiff (1966) examined the case of 
a publicly held company listed on the New York Stock Ex­
change, which had selected accounting policies in order to 
report earnings per share “...in a constant or rising pattern 
to give the effect of “pseudo” profit maximazation” (p. 66). 
Because of the information asymmetry between managers 
and shareholders, executives were in an advantageous posi­
tion relative to investors. Schiff argued that management, by 
controlling and influencing accounting information, could 
impede shareholders’ ability to monitor and evaluate man­
agers’ conduct.
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Smith (1976), again within the context of examination 
of income smoothing behaviour, explicitly addresses the 
issue of the different accounting-policy choices of owner- 
controlled and management-controlled firms31. He empiri­
cally tests the hypothesis that the management-controlled 
firms will be more likely, in comparison to the owner-con­
trolled, to smooth the level of reported profits, by making 
the appropriate selection of accounting methods. Smith ar­
gues that due to the diffusion of ownership, and the infor­
mation asymmetry that prevails in management-controlled 
firms, the managers of those firms are very likely to smooth 
accounting figures in order to provide “...a gradually rising 
performance measure...” (Smith, 1976, p. 708). By doing so 
they keep the uninformed shareholders “satisfied” and thus 
reduce the likelihood of shareholders’ rebellion and/or take­
over threat. On the other hand, in the case of owner-con- 
trolled firms there is little need and/or scope for smooth­
ing income. The owners are expected to have a direct and 
comprehensive knowledge of their firm’s affairs in gener­
al, and of accounting choices in particular. Thus, the lati­
tude for artificial manipulation of financial figures is very 
limited. Owner-controlled firms may not be so concerned 
with reducing the fluctuations in the level of reported earn­
ings, as with reducing the level of a firm’s tax burden and 
/or with reducing reported profits in order to influence la­
bour’s demands during wage negotiations. In order to test 
this hypothesis, Smith selected a sample of 110 firms - 57 
manager-controlled and 53 owner-controlled ones - listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange in 1954, and examined 
their accounting-policy decisions for the period 1954-1962. 
A firm was classified as a management-controlled one if no 
party controlled more than 5 per cent of the stock, while 
it was identified as an owner-controlled if one party con­
31. Despite the fact that this study is not primarily concerned with the in­
vestigation of the issue of income smoothing, the study of Smith will be 
discussed in some details. The reason for doing so is that the study of 
Smith has been the first one which has explicitly and formally tested op­
erational hypotheses regarding the association between accounting deci­
sion policies and firm’s ownership structure.
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trolled more than 10 per cent of the voting stock. For the 
firms in the latter group, representation of major owners 
in the board of directors and/or involvement in the firms 
management was considered as evidence of active control. 
He identified the earnings per share as a possible object of 
an income smoothing policy, and he set five targets regard­
ing their level. Subsequently, he examined for each target of 
earnings per share, and the reporting methods choices - the 
latter being perceived as instruments for achieving each tar­
get. The result of the tests supported the hypothesis, that:
“The policy decisions made by manager firms smoothed 
income significantly more often than the policy decisions 
made by owner firms.” (Smith, 1976, p.721)
Similarly, Koch’s (1981) and Amihud et al. (1983)32 findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that manager-controlled 
firms will smooth income to a greater extent than owner- 
controlled ones, while Moses (1987) found no evidence to 
support this hypothesis. Yet, empirical research suggests 
that the relationship between income smoothing behaviour 
and firm’s ownership structure, is not a straightforward one. 
For instance, Kamin and Ronen (1978 a and b, as cited in 
Hunt, 1986) provide evidence which indicates that the bar­
riers to entry prevailing in an industry can strongly affect 
the association between the two variables. More specifi­
cally, when high barriers to entry exist, manager-controlled 
firms appear to become more extensively involved in in­
come smoothing, in comparison with the owner-controlled 
ones. However, when the barriers to entry are low that rela­
32. It should be noted that Amihud et al. (1983) based their analysis with re­
gard to the smoothing behaviour of management-controlled firms as op­
posed to the owner-controlled firms, on the premise that the managers 
of the former category of firms face greater risk in comparison with the 
managers of the latter. They argue that the hired managers “...having the 
value of their human capital dependent on the performance of the firm 
they manage, and being unable to diversify away this risk, are expected to 
attempt to reduce their employment risk internally by project selection 
or by income smoothing, intended to stabilize the firm’s income stream.” 
(p. 189)
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tionship is reverted. According to Kamin and Ronen this re­
sult suggests, that the barriers to entry may have an impact 
on the ability of managers of management-controlled firms 
to smooth income. Alternatively, the owner-managers may 
have a strong incentive to smooth income when the barriers 
to entry are low.
Salamon and Smith (1979) tested the hypothesis that the 
managers of the management-controlled firms will influ­
ence accounting information, in order to provide the firm’s 
stockholders with a favourable presentation of its perfor­
mance. As a result, owners will be satisfied, and will be less 
inclined to support any takeover attempt. They called this 
hypothesis the “managerial misrepresentation” hypothesis. 
The owner-managers, on the other hand, do not have an 
incentive to misrepresent their firm’s performance. In ad­
dition, the hired managers of owner-controlled firms have 
very little discretion on variables which could be employed 
to misrepresent performance, due to the close inspection of 
their conduct by the major shareholders and owners’ easy 
assess to internal information. In order to test this hypothe­
sis, Salamon and Smith formulated two operational hypoth­
eses. According to the first hypothesis: “If the information 
misrepresentation hypothesis is correct, the association be­
tween security returns and accounting earnings will be sig­
nificantly weaker for MC [management-controlled] firms 
than for OC [owner-controlled] firms in accounting poli­
cy decision years.” (p. 320). The justification for this test is 
that, if capital markets are efficient, security returns will re­
flect firm’s economic position as it is reflected in reporting 
figures33. The second hypothesis refers to the time in which 
the change in accounting methods takes place. Salamon and 
Smith argue that it is more likely that the management of
33. With regard to the fact that the analysis is restricted only to years in 
which accounting methods change, they maintain that: "it must be real­
ized that the managers of MC firms may not need nor be able to misrep­
resent firm performance in every year" while the years in which account­
ing methods change “...are the years in which it is most likely that man­
agers may have attempted to misrepresent firm performance.” (Salamon 
and Smith, 1979, p. 321).
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management-controlled firms will attempt to influence the 
level of reported profits during years with below-average 
stock returns, than during years with above average stock 
returns. They collected relevant data for a sample of 32 
manager-controlled and 32 owner-controlled firms, for the 
period 1954-1962. A firm was identified as manager-con­
trolled when no party owned more than 5 per cent of equity 
capital, while a firm was classified as owner-controlled, (i) 
when one party controlled 10 per cent or more of the voting 
stock and exercised active control, or (ii) if one party con­
trolled 20 per cent or more of the voting stock. The results 
indicated that, in comparison with the owner-controlled 
firms, the association between earnings and stock returns 
was weaker for manager-controlled firms, while it appeared 
that there was a significant association between the securi­
ty-return performance and the timing of the reporting poli­
cy choice for the manager-controlled firms. The association 
is not significant for the owner-controlled firms. Therefore, 
both hypotheses were supported by the empirical findings 
and Salamon and Smith (1979) conclude that: “...managers 
of MC firms attempt to control the information in annual 
accounting reports in a manner which causes firm perfor­
mance to be misrepresented.” (p.327)
Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith (1982) have directly ex­
amined the association between a firm’s ownership/control 
status and their choice of accounting methods by compar­
ing the depreciation-policy choices - straight line vs. accel­
erated - of management and owner-controlled firms. They 
argue that the managers of management-controlled firms, 
in order to keep the shareholders satisfied and/or increase 
their remuneration - when accounting- numbers-based 
compensation schemes are used - will prefer accounting 
methods which will “...result in high and/or early reported 
income.” (p. 44). Conversely, in owner-controlled firms there 
is very little - if any - need to employ bonus schemes, and 
in any case the close inspection of a firm’s affairs by own­
ers precludes - or at least renders very difficult - a manipu­
lation of accounting figures by hired managers. Therefore, 
owner-controlled firms are not hypothesised as being con­
cerned with increasing reported profits, as their manage­
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ment-controlled counterparts. Instead, they are expected to 
be mainly concerned with reducing the level of tax burden 
- and possibly with reducing the level of reported profits 
in order to influence labour unions’ negotiation positions. 
Within this context, Dhaliwal et al. (1982) argue that man­
agement-controlled firms will choose depreciation methods 
which increase reported income. Thus:
"MC firms are more likely than OC firms to use straight-
line depreciation method for financial reporting purposes."
(Dhaliwall et al., 1982, p. 47)
To determine the influence of the control status on the 
firm’s accounting decisions, other factors which have been 
hypothesised to affect the choice has been studied. More 
specifically, the effect of a firm’s size and its leverage char­
acteristics have been examined34. The depreciation-method 
choices in the period of 1959-1962 for a sample of 57 man­
agement-controlled firms and 53 owner-controlled firms, 
were examined35. The outcome of the statistical analysis of 
the data, supported the hypotheses that have been devel­
34. Firms’ leverage characteristics have been assumed to be a proxy of firms’ 
proximity to violating debt covenants. A firm that is close to violating 
these covenants is likely to adopt income increasing accounting methods 
so that these constraints to be relaxed (see, latter for details regarding 
findings of empirical research concerning this issue). As far as the firms’ 
size concerns, this variable has been assumed to be a surrogate for firms 
political costs. It has been hypothesised that larger firms are more like­
ly to attract politicians attention as a possible “target” for wealth trans­
fer. Thus, the larger firms, in order to became less "politically” visible, 
are supposed to adopt income decreasing methods which will reduce 
the level of reported profits. This argument has been based on the eco­
nomic theories regarding political process. The basic assumptions that 
underlies this argument are that political process is a competition for 
wealth transfer; and everybody participating in this competition aims to 
maximise his utility. Therefore, politicians will strive to secure for them­
selves the larger proportion of the transferred wealth. As has been al­
ready mentioned, due to their size the larger firms are a more probable 
target for wealth transfer (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978,1979, and 1986; 
Zimmerman, 1983).
35. The criteria which have been employed for identifying a firm as either 
management-controlled or owner-controlled, were those adopted by 
Salamon and Smith (1979).
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oped regarding the association between the variables of in­
terest. This result conflicts with Fama’s (1980) prediction 
that there should be no difference between the behaviour of 
owner-controlled and management-controlled firms, since 
competition in the labour market will discipline the latter. 
Dhaliwall etal. (1982), conclude:
“Fama theorizes that the market for managerial talent is 
such that there will be no difference in behaviour between 
the managers of MC and OC firms. Our result indicate that 
there exists a difference in the depreciation methods adopt­
ed by MC and OC firms in the direction hypothesized by the 
theory and, thus, the results are inconsistent with the pre­
diction of Fama’s theory.” (p. 52)
Similarly, Ayres (1986) examined whether a firm’s ownership 
structure can explain its choice with regard to the adoption 
date of the SFAS 52 of FASB - dealing with the foreign cur­
rency translation. It has been hypothesised that, where dif­
ferent adoption dates can have a different impact on the 
level of reported income, the management-controlled firms 
are more likely to prefer the dates which will increase in­
come. The results were consistent with the hypothesis.
Penno and Simon (1986) investigated the accounting 
choices of private firms. In order to do so they compared 
the accounting-policy decisions of private and public firms. 
It should be noted that Penno and Simon did not explicitly 
compare the accounting policies of management and own­
er-controlled firms. However, by recognising that “...public 
firms are more likely to be manager-controlled than are pri­
vate firms.” (p.562), they introduced - at least indirectly - 
this element into their analysis. Yet, for the purposes of this 
project the distinction between public and private firms - 
irrespective of the former’ ownership structure - is impor­
tant. As the previous paragraph mentioned, whether or not 
a firm is listed can influence the trade off between tax bene­
fits and non-tax costs. Penno and Simon tested the hypoth­
esis that the publicly-traded firms, are more likely to select 
accounting methods which will have an increasing influence 
on the level of reported figures. Privately-owned companies,
C. Tzovas 1331
on the other hand, will be more concerned with reducing a 
firm’s tax burden. They argue that, due to the perceptions of 
the public-firms’ managers regarding the impact of report­
ed income on security prices, income-increasing account­
ing methods are more likely to be adopted. Furthermore, 
the dependence public-firms' managerial remuneration on 
compensation schemes, will reinforce this tendency; public 
companies are supposed to be mostly manager-controlled, 
and thus to employ bonus schemes. Privately held firms 
are not supposed to have the same incentives to choose ac­
counting policies, and thus:
“..., with less perceived need for high reported accounting in­
come, managers of private firms might have less incentive to 
use accounting policies which have real economic costs such 
as the use of FIFO inventory accounting when LIFO would 
reduce tax liabilities.” (Penno and Simon, 1986, p. 562)
In order to test the hypothesis, Penno and Simon exam­
ined the differences between accounting-policy choices for 
a sample of matched-pairs of publicly-traded and private- 
held firms. Size and industry classification was controlled 
for in the analysis. The accounting -method decisions which 
have been examined, are: (i) straight-line vs. accelerated de­
preciation; (ii) LIFO vs. other inventory method and (iii) de­
ferral versus flow-through methods for the investment tax 
credit. They assumed that “...accelerated depreciation, the 
LIFO inventory method, and deferral method of account­
ing for the investment tax credit to be income-decreasing 
alternative for each accounting choice.” (p. 562). Data was 
collected by conducting a questionnaire survey, while in 
certain cases for the publicly-held firms financial statement 
information was used. In the case of the treatment of the 
investment tax credit the results supported the hypothesis, 
although the relationship was not a significant one. In the 
case of depreciation choices and inventory methods, on the 
other hand, the result supported the hypotheses, and the 
relationship was statistically significant. Penno and Simon 
(1986) concluded that:
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"These results are consistent with the view that participation 
in external equity markets is associated with firm’s choices 
among accounting alternatives.” (p. 566)
As mentioned in the previous section, the use of account­
ing-based compensation schemes may prompt managers 
to adopt income-increasing accounting methods. The em­
ployment of bonus-plans is expected to be more common 
among the manager-controlled firms, since the need for 
motivating managers is supposed to be more pressing in this 
type of firm. The findings of the empirical research which 
examined the association between the employment of ac­
counting-based bonus plans, and firm’s accounting-policy 
decisions are not conclusive. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
who examined the factors which might have influenced 
firms’ management attitudes, towards the FASB proposal 
regarding the treatment of General Price Level Adjusted 
(GPLA) statements, concluded that the use of compensa­
tion schemes was not significantly associated with manage­
ments' disposition towards the specific proposal. Hagerman 
and Zmijewski (1979) investigated whether the usage of in­
centive plans, along with other factors - i.e. firm’s size, risk, 
capital intensity and competition - can influence a firm’s ac­
counting-policy decisions. The results indicated that the use 
of bonus plans is associated with certain accounting-treat­
ments (i.e. the choice of depreciation method, the duration 
of the amortisation period of past service costs); however, 
in other cases (inventory method and investment tax credit 
method) no significant association appears to exist36. It ap­
peared that the firms using incentive schemes were more 
likely to choose options that result in increased profits, i.e. 
straight-line depreciation method and longer amortisation 
periods. Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) examined wheth­
er the employment of (i) bonus scheme - among other fac­
tors, such as firm’s size, industry concentration, risk, capital 
intensity and the debt to asset ratio - is associated with the
36. The association between the use of incentive schemes and the choice of 
depreciation method is a weak one, since it is significant only at a level 
of 10 per cent.
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firm’s over all income strategy. In contrast to the Hagerman 
and Zmijewski (1979) study, they assume that accounting- 
policy decisions are not taken independently, but they con­
stitute a part of an strategy, which aims to achieve a given 
objective concerning the over-time income. As in the 1979 
study, they examined accounting policies concerning inven­
tory and depreciation methods, the amortisation period for 
past service pensions costs and the investment tax credit 
procedures. The results of the statistical analysis indicat­
ed that the use of incentive schemes - along with the firm’s 
size, the competition and the debt to assets ratio - influence 
the firm’s overall accounting strategy. More specifically, the 
empirical findings suggest that: “...managers are more like­
ly to choose accounting strategies that increase net income 
if such plans [management compensation plans] are avail­
able to them.” (Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981, p. 143). EI- 
Gazzar, Lilien and Postena (1986) provide evidence which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the employment of com­
pensation schemes may encourage the adoption of income- 
increasing accounting methods. In particular, they provide 
evidence which indicates that the usage of bonus-plans is 
associated with the accounting treatment of leases, which 
lead to an increase of reported income (see also Francis and 
Reiter, 1987). On the other hand, when Bowen, Noren and 
Lacey (1981) examined the factors that are associated with 
a firm’s decision regarding the treatment of capital-invest­
ment interests costs, they did not find any evidence to sup­
port the hypothesis that the employment of bonus schemes 
is likely to encourage the selection of income-increasing ac­
counting methods.
Healy (1985) criticised previous research which exam­
ined the association between the use of bonus schemes 
and accounting-policy choices, for ignoring details of the 
compensation plans. He argues that in many cases, provi­
sions in compensation-plans define earnings in such a way 
that accounting-method decisions do not affect the level of 
a bonus. Furthermore, he argues that previous studies as­
sumed that the employment of compensation plans would 
always prompt managers to prefer income-increasing ac­
counting methods. Healy maintains that when bonus plan
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include binding upper and/or lower bounds, managers may 
be motivated towards income-reducing accounting meth­
ods. Compensation schemes:
“...typically permit funds to be set aside for compensation 
awards when earnings exceed a specified target. If earnings 
are so low that no matter which accounting procedures are 
selected target earnings will not be met, managers have in­
centives to further reduce current earnings by deferring rev­
enues or accelerating write-offs, a strategy known as "tak­
ing a bath”. This strategy does not affect the current bonus 
awards and increases the probability of meeting future earn­
ings' targets.” (Healy, 1985, p. 86)
By taking these parameters into account, Healy attempted to 
investigate the relationship between compensation schemes 
and accounting-policy decisions. He examined the associa­
tion between a compensation plan’s terms, and managers’ 
decisions regarding accruals and accounting procedures. 
The results indicated that a significant relationship exists 
between accrual decisions and managers’ incentive regard­
ing income, as these emerge from the terms of the compen­
sation plan. More specifically, it appears that when incen­
tive plans include binding upper or lower bounds, manag­
ers are likely to choose income-decreasing accruals, while 
when bounds are not binding, income increasing accruals 
are more likely to be preferred. As far as accounting-proce­
dure choices are concerned, results confirm that in the pe­
riod following the adoption or modification of a compensa­
tion plan, a high frequency of changes in accounting proce­
dures occur. It should be pointed out, though, that the pres­
ence of binding bounds - upper or low ones - did not seem 
to prompt managers to adopt income-decreasing account­
ing procedures.
Many studies which investigated the choices of an inven­
tory method, have not explicitly introduce the trade-off be­
tween tax benefits and non-tax costs as an element in their 
analysis, however by examining their findings some useful 
insights can be obtained. For instance, Abdel-Khalik (1985) 
when investigating whether the inventory-method decision
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is related to the effect that such decisions have on mana­
gerial compensation indirectly introduced the element of 
non-tax costs that managers face when pursue a tax reduc­
ing policy. Abdel-Khalik argued that managerial ownership 
is a factor that can influence managers’ inventory-method 
decisions. The FIFO vs. LIFO decision a effects a firm’s tax 
liability and as a result can influence that firm’s share price. 
When managers’ wealth is primarily dependent on the value 
of their stock holdings, they prefer the LIFO method. On 
the other hand, if managers’ compensation is strongly cor­
related with accounting-based bonus payments, it is expect­
ed that the FIFO method will be preferred. Abdel-Khalik 
hypothesises that an owner-manager’s wealth is primarily 
dependent on the value of the share-holdings, while the re­
muneration of a manager of management-controlled firms 
is more dependent on accounting-based bonus schemes. 
Therefore, a firm’s ownership structure can influence the 
choice inventory-method. As Abdel-Khalik argues: “The 
ownership variable could influence this choice to the extent 
that executives in owner-controlled firms derive more per­
sonal wealth from increases in the value of their stock hold­
ings than would come about from the switch to LIFO” (p. 
430). Within the context of a tax benefits vs. non-tax costs 
analysis, the implication would have been that for manage­
ment-controlled firms, the tax benefits which result from a 
LIFO-adoption will be foregone in the face of the increased 
accounting profits related to a FIFO-adoption. Consequent­
ly, the FIFO will be preferred. The reverse reasoning applies 
for the owner-controlled firms. Owner-controlled firms are 
likely to adopt the LIFO, due to the tax benefits that ensue 
from such a choice. However, the results did not indicate 
that for firms that switched from FIFO to LIFO, there was 
any difference between the management and owner-con- 
trolled firms, with regard to the structure of payment to ex­
ecutives. Furthermore, results testified that on average the 
executives’ compensation for the firms that switch to LIFO 
was not adversely affected. That result indicates, accord­
ing to Abdel-Khalik, that bonus plans had been adapted in 
response to the change in the accounting method. On the 
other hand, the results indicated that the management-con­
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trolled firms which retained the FIFO method had a higher 
accounting-based schemes, compared with the other firms.
Hunt (1985) also identified ownership-structure as an 
explanatory variable regarding firms inventory-method 
choice. Similarly to Abdel-Khalik, Hunt hypothesised that 
owner-managers’ wealth is more correlated with share val­
ue. In management-controlled firms, accounting income 
can have an important impact on bonus payments, and as 
a consequence on managers’ wealth. Thus, management- 
controlled firms are more likely to retain the FIFO method, 
while owner-controlled ones are more likely to switch to the 
LIFO. Hunt has also hypothesised that firms that have em­
ployed LIFO are less likely to use accounting-determined 
bonus schemes. In addition to the ownership-structure, the 
firms’ ability to avoid breaching debt-covenants has been 
identified as a factor influencing firms’ inventory-method 
choice. More specifically, it has been hypothesised that the 
closer a firm was to violating debt-covenants, the less likely 
it was to adopt the LIFO method. Again a tax benefits vs. 
non-tax costs framework can be applied. The non-tax costs 
that are related to the adoption of the LIFO method may 
prompt a firm to prefer the FIFO method, despite the tax 
costs that accompany that choice. The results of univariate 
and multivariate tests were consistent with the hypothesis 
that the closer a firm is to violating the lending-related con­
straints, the less likely it is to adopt the LIFO method. Con­
cerning the link between ownership structure and invento­
ry-method choice, the results were not consistent with the 
hypothesis. In particular, not only no relationship emerged 
between the inventory-method choice and the usage of in­
come-based bonus schemes, but it appears that firms which 
adopted the LIFO method had a significantly lower levels of 
managerial ownership.
Within the context of tax benefits vs. non-tax costs anal­
ysis, Hunt’s findings regarding the inventory-method choic­
es of firms closing to violating debt-covenants are consistent 
with the findings of Matsounaga et al. (1992) and Maydew 
(1997) reported earlier. It should be noted, however, that 
Sweeney (1992, as cited in Smith, 1993) provides evidence 
which suggests that when an accounting-method choice
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have significant tax costs - as in the case of choice between 
LIFO vs. FIFO - the firm is likely prefer the method which 
ensures greater tax benefits, despite the increase in the like­
lihood of violating debt covenants.
Concerning the link between ownership-structure and 
tax-related considerations, the two aforementioned studies 
suggest that it may not be that strong. Niehaus (1989), on 
the other hand, provides evidence which supports the hy­
pothesis that there is an association between a firm’s own­
ership structure, and its accounting-method decisions. His 
findings suggest that the tax benefits and non-tax costs re­
lated with each method can influence the firm’s decision. 
Niehaus argues that in firms with concentrated outside 
ownership, the owners’ wealth is mainly a function of the 
value of their stock holdings. Additionally, shareholders can 
effectively monitor and control mangers’ actions. Thus, the 
concentrated-ownership firms are expected to adopt ac­
counting methods, which result in an increase of tax sav­
ings.
A conflict of interest between owners and managers may 
arise, however, since the latter, for the reasons which have 
been previously discussed, will prefer high reported profits. 
The extent of managers’ ownership of the firm’s stock capital 
can influence their attitude towards a tax-reducing choice. 
In particular, in case that managers own a substantial pro­
portion of shares, their interests are likely to be aligned with 
those of the owners. On the other hand, an increased man­
agers’ ownership, can reduce the ability of owners to control 
managers. As a result, the managers’ discretion regarding 
accounting-method choices, is enhanced. Under these cir­
cumstances, it is likely that the relationship between mana­
gerial ownership and the firm’s accounting choices will be a 
non-monotonic one.
In order to investigate these issues, Niehaus examined 
the inventory-method choice of a sample of industrial firms 
which differed with regard to the extent of managerial own­
ership. Furthermore, Niehaus investigated the relation­
ship between the ownership-structure and other account­
ing methods choices, such as depreciation methods and in­
vestment tax credit methods. He argues, that since the ac­
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counting treatment of those items might be different for 
tax and financial reporting purposes respectively, it is less 
likely that a conflict of interest will arise between managers 
and shareholders37. The results were consistent with all hy­
potheses. No significant relationship existed between firm’s 
ownership structure, and the choice of depreciation method 
and investment tax credit method38. Regarding the inven­
tory-method choice, the hypothesis that high outside-own­
ership will increase the likelihood of adopting a tax reduc­
ing method, i.e. LIFO, has been confirmed. Regarding the 
hypothesis about the association between the managerial 
ownership and the inventory-method choice, the results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that their relationship can be 
a non-monotonic one. As Niehaus (1989) states:
"...the probability of choosing LIFO initially decreases as 
managerial ownership increases. Beyond a point, however, 
the probability of choosing LIFO increases with managerial 
ownership.” (p. 283)
These findings suggest, that for a firm’s executives, the re­
lated with a tax reducing policy non-tax costs, vary - in a 
non-monotonic way - on the basis of the proportion of their 
stock capital ownership. The fact that below a certain level 
of managerial ownership managers choose the income-in­
creasing method, may indicate that the accounting-based 
bonus payments constitute a larger proportion of their per­
sonal wealth, compared to the wealth attributed to stock 
ownership. Above a certain level of stock ownership, how­
ever, this relationship is reversed and the tax reducing meth­
37. He recognises, however, that even in the case of these accounting choices 
a conflict of interest can arise. As he states: “A conflict can still exist if 
shareholders do not factor in the incentives of managers to choose in­
come increasing accounting methods when compensation contracts are 
designed. In addition, a conflict exists with these accounting choices in 
the sense that shareholders prefer to pay managers lower compensation, 
ceteris paribus" (p. 281).
38. With respect to the choice of depreciation method decision, this result 
contrasts with the findings of Dhaliwal et al. (1982), who have argued 
that the choice of depreciation method and the firm’s ownership struc­
ture are not independent of each other.
C. Tzovas 1339
od will be preferred. It appears that concentrated outside 
ownership reduces the possibility of value-reducing actions 
from managers. Thus even when managers have a motive to 
prefer income-increasing methods, their tight monitoring 
by the shareholders, secures that a tax reducing methods 
will be adopted. Therefore, when an accounting choice has 
implications regarding the level of a firms’ tax burden, that 
firm’s ownership/control status can influence the choice39.
Wolfson (1993) reports evidence which is consistent 
with Niehaus’ findings. That is, the non-tax costs of a tax re­
ducing strategy are expected to be less significant for firms 
where ownership is concentrated to a restricted number of 
shareholders. Thus, these firms are more likely compared 
to diffused-ownership firms, to get involved in aggressive 
tax planning. In addition, Wolfson maintains that when ac­
counting for financial reporting purposes is distinct from 
the accounting for tax purposes, firms are more likely to 
pursue an active tax reducing policy, since the ensuing re­
duction in tax liability will not be accompanied with a re­
duced reported income. For instance, in most of the Con­
tinental European countries and in Japan, a great degree of 
conformity between tax and financial reporting regulation 
prevails. Furthermore, the ownership structure of most cor­
porations in these countries is characterised by a high level 
of concentration. According to Wolfson, the fact that the 
earnings-to-price ratio of European and Japanese compa­
nies, is significantly lower than the corresponding ratio for 
the US and the UK companies - Elliot, Morse, and Souza, 
1990 (as cited in Wolfson, 1993) - provide “...striking evi­
dence of the systematic effect of tax-book (non)conformity 
rules on the economic and statistical properties of reported 
earnings.” (p.321). Wolfson concludes that firms from Con­
tinental Europe and Japan “...suffer the financial reporting 
consequences of lower reported income so as to achieve tax 
savings.” (p. 321). French and Poterba (1991) maintain that:
39. In addition, Niehaus results testify that managerial ownership of firm’s 
capital is not enough for aligning shareholders and managers’ interest. It 
is necessary that stock owned by managers constitute a substantial pro­
portion of their wealth.
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“Virtually all [Japanese] firms choose accelerated deprecia­
tion, which minimizes current taxes, rather than straight- 
line depreciation, which maximizes current reported earn­
ings.” (p. 349).
Furthermore, evidence from the US seems to support 
the argument that owner-controlled firms are more likely to 
get involved in tax-planning. Similarly to Matsunaga et al. 
(1992), Wolfson provides evidence which is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the financial reporting consequences of 
the disqualification of stock options are an important con­
sideration for a firm’s management, despite the consider­
able tax-costs that can ensue. However, Wolfson’s findings 
indicate that firms which disqualified incentive options 
were characterised by highly concentrated ownership, a fact 
which testifies that “...concentrated ownership promotes 
more aggressive tax planning behaviour in the face of con­
flicting financial reporting considerations.” (p. 324). In addi­
tion, he provides evidence which suggests, that when a tax- 
reducing policy does not affect the financial figures, such a 
policy will be pursued more aggressively. For instance, the 
fact that the adoption of accelerated depreciation meth­
ods and the preference of debt instead of equity, contrib­
utes to the reduction of a firm’s tax burden, without, how­
ever, affecting reported income, may explain the popularity 
of these two options among US corporations (see, French 
and Poterba, 1991; Scholes and Wolfson, 1992). More spe­
cifically, French and Poterba (1991) argue that the fact that 
US firms can employ one depreciation method for tax pur­
poses and another for financial reporting ones, leads most 
of them to employ accelerated depreciation for tax report­
ing purposes, while for financial reporting ones they gener­
ally employ the straight-line method. In contrast, Japanese 
corporations, despite the fact that they have the option of 
choosing accelerated or straight-line depreciation method 
are required to use the same method for tax and financial 
purposes alike. As mentioned just above, the vast majority 
of Japanese companies adopt the tax-reducing option. Giv­
en the differences in the ownership structure between the 
US and Japanese companies, these findings may indicate, 
that for firms with highly concentrated ownership (Japanese
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firms), tax reduction will be the main consideration. On the 
other hand, when firms are characterised by a diffused own­
ership (US firms), managers’ concerns centre around the ef­
fect that the level of reported income can have on their re­
muneration.
Klassen (1997) argued that the level of ownership con­
centration influences the informational environment in 
which a firm operates. In firms with a highly concentrat­
ed ownership, the firm’s management can directly access 
shareholders information concerning managers’ and firms’ 
performance, without being dependent on published ac­
counts. On the other hand, in diffused-ownership firms, 
management is more dependent on financial statements 
for communicating information to capital markets. These 
considerations have been hypothesised as influencing the 
balance between the tax and non-tax. Managers of widely- 
held firms are more likely to aim at an increased reported 
income, despite the increase in the level of a firm’s tax liabil­
ity. In order to test this hypothesis, Klassen examines the as­
sociation between the levels of concentration a firm’s own­
ership, and the divestiture decision, since such a decision 
is related with substantial tax and non-tax costs. The firms 
with concentrated ownership are more likely to carry out 
divestitures of assets which incorporate unrealised losses, 
since by doing so they reduce taxable income. On the other 
hand, the management of widely-held firms is more likely 
to divest assets incorporating unrealised gains, since such 
a decision enhances reported income40. The results overall 
were consistent with the hypothesis that a firm’s ownership 
structure is associated with its accounting policy choice and 
influences the trade-off between tax benefits and non-tax 
costs.
40. However, such a decision has a reducing effect on a firm’s value, not only 
because it increases tax payment, but because the firm is deprived of as­
sets which can generate a value greater than their liquidation price. Yet, 
managers will undertake such action in order to increase reported prof­
its. Stain (1989) argues that despite the fact that markets will anticipate 
that fact, managers will behave "myopically” believing that the high cur­
rent reported profits will influence the markets evaluation of a firm’s and 
a manager’s performance
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Whether a firm is public or private may influence the 
trade-off between tax benefits and non-tax costs. Despite 
the fact that a management-controlled firm is very unlikely 
to be a private one, possibility cannot be ruled out that a 
closely-held firm is listed. Therefore, whether a firm is list­
ed is a characteristic that can generate non-tax costs. Pen- 
no and Simon (1986) have provided evidence which is con­
sistent with the hypothesis that managers of public firms, 
due to their perceptions regarding the impact that account­
ing information can have on stock market participants, are 
more likely, compared to the managers of private firms, to 
prefer income-increasing accounting methods. Executives 
of private firms will be less concerned by the level of report­
ed income, and more interested in reducing tax liability. It 
appears that private firms are more likely to adopt the LIFO 
against the FIFO method: a choice with tax-reducing effects. 
Cloyd, Pratt and Stock (1996) investigated whether the fact 
that a firm is a public or a private one influences the balance 
between the tax benefits and non-tax costs. They examined 
the extent to which a firm uses financial accounting in order 
to support aggressive tax positions. They argue that a firm’s 
management "... may choose a financial accounting method 
that conforms to the tax choice (i.e., conformity) in an effort 
to increase the probability that the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) will allow the tax treatment.” (p. 23). Despite the fact 
that the tax conformity leads to increased tax savings, it can 
also lead to an increase in non-tax costs. Under these cir­
cumstances, it is important that “..., the value of the expect­
ed tax savings must be balanced against the non-tax costs 
associated with conformity.” (Cloyd et al., 1996, pp. 24 - 25). 
They argue that, assuming unchanging non-tax costs, the 
possibility of conformity will increase as the level of the tax 
benefit increases. However, as the non-tax costs increase 
the likelihood of tax compliance decreases. The non-tax 
costs are hypothesised to be related to whether or not the 
firm is listed; management of publicly-held firms is expected 
to face greater non-tax costs, compared to management of 
those privately-held. The dependence of the former’s remu­
neration on reported income, and their perceptions regard­
ing the influence that accounting figures can have on the
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markets’ evaluation of firms’ and managers’ performance, 
may induce them to not exploit significant tax benefits. In 
order to test this hypothesis they conducted a mail survey. 
It was hypothesised that the extent to which tax conformity 
will be chosen, was influenced by the extent to which it will 
increase the possibility of defending an aggressive tax posi­
tion. The research instrument was mailed to the financial 
executives of a sample of publicly-held and private US man­
ufacturing firms. Participants were asked to choose, with­
in the context of a fictional case, between accounting treat­
ments which had tax related consequences. In every case the 
possibility of successfully defending the resulting tax posi­
tion have been provided. A firm’s proximity in violating debt 
covenants was identified as a control variable. In addition, 
the extent to which respondents believe that the firm’s share 
price is influenced by reported income as opposed to real 
cash flows, and whether a firm employs a bonus schemes, 
were examined. The results indicated that on average, the 
managers of public-firms believed that accounting profits 
have greater influence on firms’ share price than cash flows; 
for the managers of the private firms the reverse seems to 
hold. Consequently the managers of public firms, are likely 
to face greater non-tax costs. Regarding the employment of 
bonus schemes, the results indicated that the use of bonus 
schemes is widespread in public-firms, while among the pri­
vate firms is very limited; again the managers of public firms 
are more likely to face greater non-tax costs41. Concerning 
the relationship between accounting-method decisions and 
whether the firm is public or private, the results supported 
the hypothesis that: “...public-firm managers are less likely 
to choose conformity, perhaps because they face higher lev­
els of non-tax costs from reporting lower income.” (Cloyd et 
al., 1996, p. 41)42.
41. It should be noted that Cloyd et al. did not investigate whether the in­
centive scheme is a direct cash-payment based on accounting numbers 
or whether it takes the form of stock-options. In the case of the second 
option the managers would prefer higher reported profits, since it has 
been mentioned they believe that accounting profits significantly influ­
ences stock value.
42. Of course, the findings of Klassen (1997) suggest that listed firms which
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Conclusions
The evidence provided by the studies reported above clear­
ly suggests that tax considerations influence the accounting 
choices of a firm. Yet, it seems that non-tax costs are related 
to a tax-minimising strategy may impede a firm from fully 
realising tax benefits; non-tax considerations may dominate 
tax-related ones, and firms tax-reducing policy may be ad­
justed accordingly. Scholes et al. (1990) explain: “...efficient 
tax planning may be very different from simple tax minimi­
zation.” (p. 627).
have concentrated ownership, face less significant non-tax costs, com­
pared to the diffused-ownership listed firms. This does not mean, how­
ever, that they never face non-tax costs or that when they do face then, 
that their reporting behaviour will not be affected.
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